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Executive Summary 
The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan, UNMISS, is one of 
the most ambitious operations in UN history, in terms of local-level 
peacebuilding. In the course of the next three years, UNMISS aims to 
establish 35 County Support Bases (CSBs) in the ten states of South 
Sudan. According to Ms Hilde Johnson, UN Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General (SRSG) and head of UNMISS, these are to 
serve as a platform and a portal for early peacebuilding activities.  
 
This report is part of a comparative study of UN local peacebuilding 
in three countries – Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan. When initiating 
this study, the research team chose the Civil Affairs (CA) section of 
UN peacekeeping operations as an entry point, as this section is usual-
ly deployed wherever the peacekeeping mission has established 
presences, and is tasked with, inter alia, acting as the intermediary 
with local authorities and populations, as well as the rest of the UN 
peacekeeping mission and other UN actors.  
 
The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan is unique, as the first 
UN peacekeeping mission with an explicit and comprehensive peace-
building mandate. The mandate has, however, been carefully crafted 
so as not to put the main responsibility of peacebuilding on the UN. It 
states that that the UN should ‘develop an early strategy in support of 
national peacebuilding priorities’1 which can ‘can deliver prioritized 
support that reflects the specific peacebuilding needs and priorities of 
the Republic of South Sudan.’2 The civil affairs section is present in 
all field locations, but in the set-up envisaged by the SRSG their re-
sponsibility will be focused on the core tasks of conflict mitigation 
and political space. Reintegration, reconstruction and peacebuilding 
(RRP) officers will be responsible for enabling the CSBs to operate 
according to the vision of the SRSG.  
 
This report is structured in two main segments. The first part examines 
how CAD has been implementing its key tasks, including the difficult 
balancing act of working with both institutional and non-institutional 
actors; the second section considers more broadly how UNMISS, with 
its RRP officers, envisages engaging with the rest of the UN system 
and other peacebuilding and development partners.  
 
                                                 
1  UNSC, "S/RES/1996," United Nations Security Council, 
 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp_symbol/RES/1996%282011%29: p.2. 
2  Ibid.: p. 7.  
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Civil affairs (CA) are playing an important role in facilitating recon-
ciliation and dialogue in South Sudan. While CA officers often remark 
that they frequently act as ‘travel agents’ facilitating travel for gov-
ernment officials at the local, state and national levels, their role 
should not be underestimated, as it enables officials to attend peace 
conferences and engage with local populations to hear their com-
plaints and concerns. This is the first step towards building a relation-
ship between the government and its people, with a participatory sys-
tem of governance where the periphery is better linked up with the 
centre in a state.  
 
While it is critical that international actors work side by side with 
government, it is equally important that CA officers, and all other in-
ternational actors operating at the local level, engage with customary 
authorities as well as emerging community-based organizations 
(CBOs), the local churches, youth, women and local civil society. In 
many instances, the influence of elders and traditional authorities has 
been weakened by the civil war. Government-appointed chiefs may 
also not be representative of their communities, so all UN officials and 
other partners must be able to understand the complex political econ-
omy and dynamics on state and local levels in order to do more good 
than harm.   
 
The CSBs are part of a very ambitious plan for further strengthening 
the presence of national authorities on the local level. Based on the 
principle of equality between international peacekeepers and national 
authorities, each of the CSBs will co-locate local authorities with the 
UN, sharing the same standards of buildings, internet access and facil-
ities. They will also facilitate access for other partners within and out-
side the UN system, including civil society organizations (CSOs).  
 
As such, the CSBs carry a great promise to the local population that 
the mission will be wise to heed. Unless the presences can be paral-
leled with service delivery and real peace dividends for local popula-
tions, they will result in anger and loss of confidence in peacekeepers 
and local authorities alike. They will thus be a prism through which it 
may be possible to follow and measure to which degree the interna-
tional community and the government in Juba are managing to instil 
the trust and confidence needed to achieve ‘real’ peacebuilding from 
the ground up in South Sudan. While all actors should have a sober 
vision about what the UN can realistically be expected to achieve with 
a few CSBs in a country the size of France, there is no doubt that the 
CSBs will be an initiative that merits continued and careful scrutiny 
by the international and research community alike.  
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Summary of recommendations 
1. Civil affairs and local-level engagement 
- Consider embedding/co-locating CA officers in relevant state-
level government offices, in coordination with UNDP and 
AECOM  
- Continue to support an inclusive dialogue with the political op-
position  
- Encourage local government authorities to work with custom-
ary authority structures, including inviting them to meetings, 
ceremonies and other events 
- Make use of local CBOs and CSOs to reach out to the popula-
tion and the village level. 
2. Can local actors influence national decision-making pro-
cesses? 
- Press for a more participatory approach among national deci-
sion-making organs and politicians, through the SRSG on the 
strategic level and CA officers on the operational and tactical 
levels 
- Make sure that the CSBs contribute to feeding local voices into 
national policy processes, including youth, civil society and 
customary authorities  
- Continue and expand the cooperation between UNDP and 
CAD on CSAC consultations and use the presence of the CSBs 
to broaden these also to the county level.   
3. The UN and local peacebuilding – moving from civil affairs 
to County Support Bases (CSBs) 
- Share the baseline study undertaken in the payams with civil 
society and other development actors to get their inputs and 
enable programming for local-level peacebuilding and devel-
opment  
- Ensure close cooperation in CSBs and on state and national 
levels between CA and the RRP section/UN country team  
- The CSBs should be externally evaluated after the first year of 
operation to improve value for money, effectiveness and own-
ership among local stakeholders, and remedy possible unin-
tended consequences  
- Review the implications of the transfer of QIPs from CA to the 
RRP officers after one year as regards effectiveness, compara-
tive advantages, and possible unintended consequences 
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- Follow up the IGAD initiative as a potential model for AU 
support, as well as for other UN missions, also noting any un-
intended consequences. 
4. Promoting local ownership – the recurring challenge 
- Continuously consider and reflect on questions of legitimacy of 
local actors 
- Involve the youth, as well as other groups such as elders and 
women, in peace conferences and events, as well throughout 
the entire long-term follow-up process 
- Continue the decentralized mission agenda that empowers local 
CAD teams to operate contextually and flexibly, including de-
veloping policy lines for state coordinators approach to their 
local substantive teams 
- Sensitize UNDSS and other administrative sections such as 
MOVCON to the flexible nature of peacebuilding/CA work. 
5. Can the UN strengthen the confidence of local populations 
in central authorities? 
- Allocate all state coordinator positions to individuals with a 
civil affairs background: that means persons with back-
grounds from the country or at least the region, as well as 
experience in conflict management, analysis and local 
peacebuilding  
- Promote greater information-sharing of CAD conflict anal-
ysis and reports within and beyond the mission, including 
to government and UNDP, while acknowledging that some 
information may be too politically sensitive to share with 
the government. 
We concentrate on the top of the tree but we have to focus on 
the roots.3 
 
Right now, the GoSS cannot implement anything except if it uses 
an international organization to do it.4 
 
 
Introduction  
This project has examined how the UN is undertaking local-level early 
peacebuilding, focusing on the efforts of the UN DPKO Civil Affairs 
section. The rationale for making this connection between CA and lo-
cal-level peacebuilding is grounded in the evolving understanding that 
‘peacekeepers are peacebuilders’5 and should implement early peace-
building tasks.6 In peacekeeping missions, the Civil Affairs section is 
most frequently deployed throughout the host country, providing the 
UN with a presence on the local level. The project looks at how Civil 
Affairs in several missions operationalize and implement their man-
dates, through field research in Haiti (United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti – MINUSTAH), Liberia (United Nations Mission in 
Liberia – UNMIL) and South Sudan – (United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan – UNMISS). It also studies how the UN peacekeeping 
more broadly is organizing its work on the local level and working 
together with local authorities, other UN agencies and development 
actors. 
 
The overall objective of the project is to see how the early peacebuild-
ing activities of these actors are contextualized to local circumstances. 
In a UN peacekeeping context, the civil affairs section, as the compo-
nent most consistently present in the field, is often set to perform the 
very challenging and courageous act of serving as the intermediary for 
the various actors: between the local population and local government, 
and the mission itself, frequently acting as a space-maker for other 
                                                 
3  Interview with South Sudanese Catholic Relief Service staff in Eastern Equatoria State, 
referring to the international community’s focus in South Sudan. 
4  Interview with Eastern Equatoria State Peace Coordinator and Secretary to the State Peace 
and Reconciliation Committee, revealing the sense of dependency felt by the government 
towards the international community.  
5  United Nations 2012., Peace: Keep it. Build it. The Contribution of United Nations 
Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding: Strategy. UN DPKO and DFS, New York: p. 10.   
6  As defined by the Secretary-General in his opening remarks of the Security Council dis-
cussion on peacebuilding, 13 October 2010 (UN 2010), where he stressed that peacekeep-
ing missions should be enabled ‘to have an impact as “early peacebuilders”’. The meeting 
in the Security Council was held to discuss the latest Progress Report of the Secretary-
General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (UN 2010). 
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actors to take on their roles, including early peacebuilding activities.7 
Also in the academic literature there is increasing consensus that the 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding divide is an artificial one, and in reality, 
civilian peacekeepers should be considered early peacebuilders.8 The 
question then is how/if they can perform a catalytic and enabling role 
to facilitate the developmental activities of other actors, UN and oth-
ers, so as to create peace dividends out of their presence.  
 
What has been missing in the research is a focus on practical aspects 
at the subnational level and on adapting activities to local needs and 
political realities. In Sudan, an ACCORD study on UNMIS’ work in 
local peacebuilding in Southern Sudan prior to independence notes the 
importance of understanding local context, adapting conflict resolu-
tion efforts and supporting local stakeholders, instead of implementing 
on behalf of local actors.9 While the focus of the present report is on 
the role of CA, it will look to frame these within the wider United Na-
tions engagement in local-level peacebuilding in South Sudan. 
Structure of the report and guiding questions 
Following a brief overview of the country context and local-level 
peacebuilding challenges in South Sudan, the report provides a brief 
introduction to the history of UN peacekeeping, focusing on South 
Sudan, as well as a short section on the overall roles, responsibilities 
and challenges of CA in South Sudan. The report seeks to elucidate 
some core research questions developed jointly by NUPI and UN 
DPKO Best Practices:  
 
 What kinds of mechanisms have been used to feed the voices of 
local institutional and non-institutional actors into political pro-
cesses? 
 Are local institutional and non-institutional actors able to influ-
ence national decision-making processes, and if so, how? 
                                                 
7  For policy documents on the role of UN DPKO on the local level, see e.g. United Nations 
2008. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, (‘The Cap-
stone Doctrine”) Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York: United Nations. 
Available at:  
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.p
df; and United Nations DPKO 2008. Policy Directive: Civil Affairs, Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations; 
and Department of Field Support, April 2008. Available at: 
http://www.undg.org/docs/8915/Civil-Affairs-Policy.pdf; United Nations (2008).  
8  See e.g. ACCORD 2011. Conflict Trends 3/2011 issue dedicated exclusively to the 
peacebuilding–peacekeeping nexus. Available at: 
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2011_3.pdf.  
9  ACCORD 2010. The Conflict Management Work of the Civil Affairs Division of the Unit-
ed Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), ACCORD Training for Peace.  
The term ‘local actors’ is extremely broad and requires deconstruction and acknowledging 
the complexity and contradiction inherent in the term when using it. For the purpose of 
this report, the term ‘local actors’ is simplified to refer to local government authorities, 
customary authorities, and local civil society groups. 
Moving towards local-level peacebuilding?    17 
 
17 
 How are the needs for service provision and political participation 
dealt with on the local level, and how do these needs feed into de-
cision-making processes? 
 Are civil affairs officers promoting local ownership and effective 
participation of all stakeholders in decision-making processes, 
and if so, how?  
 How can civil affairs officers contribute to the strengthening of 
confidence of the local population in local authorities, and the 
support given by the UN and other international actors? 
 How does the cross-mission representation role of civil affairs fa-
cilitate implementation and/or transition, etc.? 
Methodology 
The research in South Sudan consisted of four weeks of fieldwork, 
from October to November 2011 where some 60 extended qualitative 
interviews were conducted in the capital Juba and in two the states of 
Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria. The team was composed of Diana 
Felix da Costa, John Karlsrud and Philip Ohuyoro Karlo. Research 
conceptualization was done together by NUPI and the UN DPKO Civ-
il Affairs Best Practices Section. The team was hosted and supported 
by UNMISS’s civil affairs division (CAD) and was able to count on 
the invaluable administrative and logistical support of CA officers 
throughout the field office visits.  
 
The first week was spent in Juba interviewing HQ senior staff and 
South Sudanese intellectuals and academic staff from the University 
of Juba. Two one-week visits were made to Eastern Equatoria State 
and Upper Nile State. Interviews were limited to Torit and Malakal 
towns. Although visits to other counties in the two states had been 
planned initially, these had to be cancelled because of security con-
cerns and various unforeseen events. The final few days were spent in 
Juba where the team met with civil affairs and UNDP at headquarters 
level to discuss the preliminary findings and receive feedback. 
 
The methods and tools used throughout the research were anthropolo-
gy-based and qualitative. In addition to participant observation and 
semi-structured interviews, the research team held several informal 
discussions with UN CA officers, other substantive sections within the 
mission, UNDP staff, state-level government, and CSOs. Six focus-
group discussions were carried out with members of the general popu-
lation, in local markets in Eastern Equatoria and Upper Nile States, 
and with students at the University of Juba.  
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Table 1: Interviews conducted in each location, by organizational back-
ground and gender10 
 
  
CA staff 
Other 
UNMISS staff 
UN agencies 
Government 
authorities 
Civil society 
General 
Population 
 Gender M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Total 8 3 3 4 4 1 6 0 17 2 27 16 
 
Discussions aimed at outlining the key experiences and challenges of 
CA officers, including strategies they had found for contextualizing 
their mandates. Interviews with non-CAD participants were intended 
to develop alternate perspectives on the work of CAD; better under-
standing cross-mission coordination and cooperation; and cooperation 
with non-UN actors, including local stakeholders. Discussions with 
the wide array of local actors also sought to assess expectations and 
understandings of UNMISS in general, and CAD in particular. Indi-
vidual case studies were explored to supplement the team’s under-
standing of CAD work.  
Challenges in methodology 
The study offers some useful insights and reflections on civil affairs 
work in South Sudan, from the perspective of CA officers as well as 
that of local actors.  However, it is not intended as a comprehensive 
account of UN efforts in local peacebuilding, nor of CA work in South 
Sudan, particularly given the highly localized nature of local political 
dynamics. More time would have been needed for a more comprehen-
sive and deeper analysis.   
 
It was not possible to find many women in relevant local government 
positions, so there is an overwhelmingly male voice throughout the 
research. Whenever possible, the team made efforts to seek women to 
speak with, so as to enable a more nuanced gender perspective.  
 
 
                                                 
10  This table includes only those interviews formally conducted as interviews – not include 
the team’s many background talks and informative exchanges with people from all organ-
izational backgrounds. However, these more informal exchanges inform the following 
text as much as the formal interviews, and should be recognized as part of the process of 
participatory observation and fieldwork.   
Background 
Brief country context and challenges to local peacebuilding 
South Sudan has been marked by war for over 40 years. In the past 20 
years, the conflict has claimed at least 2 million lives,11 caused the 
displacement of more than 4 million people,12 and destroyed what lit-
tle infrastructure existed. The country has a structural deficit of human 
capacities and skills. As argued in a recent report, ‘the challenge for 
South Sudan is one of construction rather than reconstruction’.13 In 
terms of human development, South Sudan is one of the poorest coun-
tries on earth,14 but because of the country’s oil revenues, average in-
come per capacity is one of the highest in the region.15 However, most 
of the population must struggle to survive on less than one USD per 
day.16 
 
Porous borders adjoining difficult regions contribute to insecurity, and 
the relationship with Sudan remains critical.17 The provision of essen-
tial services like education, health and water remains very limited. 
This is compounded by a general lack of infrastructure, which in-
creases the challenge of security, and restricts access to services and 
markets that could aid economic development. Much of the country 
remains isolated with few or no roads, particularly during the rainy 
season, and many areas are accessible only by air or on foot. Most 
states are marked by widespread local violence and conflicts. The 
widespread proliferation of small arms remains a significant chal-
lenge,18 and at the time of writing several serious conflicts were ongo-
                                                 
11  Save the Children UK (2011), South Sudan – A post-independence agenda for action, 
London: Save the Children UK, p. 2. 
12  Ibid, p. 2. 
13  Ibid, p. 2. 
14  As the country was only half a year old at the time of writing, there were no data available 
from the World Bank or the UNDP Human Development Report on GDP per capita or 
ranking in terms of human development.  
15  GDP per capita in 2010 was estimated at US$1,546 compared to US$769 in Kenya and 
just US$189 in Burundi. See The Republic of South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics 
(2011), Release of first GDP and GNI figures for South Sudan.  Available at 
http://ssnbs.org/home/2011/8/11/release-of-first-gdp-and-gni-figures-for-south-
sudan.html, accessed 22 December 2011. GNI is significantly lower at US$ 984, due to 
the sharing of oil revenues with the Sudan. 
16  Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, 2010. 
17  See e.g. J. Giroux et al. (2009), The tormented triangle: the regionalization of conflict in 
Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic, Crisis States Research Centre, Working 
Paper No. 47. London: London School of Economics.  
18  The widespread proliferation of arms was mentioned as a key issue by most interviewees. 
See also the UNDP Country Consultation Reports done in 2010 under the UNDP Com-
munity Security and Arms Control project; as well as the Republic of Sudan Conflict Mit-
igation and Stabilization Plan July 2011-July 2012 for Upper Nile State and Eastern Equa-
toria State. 
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ing,19 both internally in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity State, and with 
the neighbouring Sudan over the disputed border area of Abyei.20 
Moreover, the conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States cause 
insecurity along the Sudan–South Sudan border and have led to the 
displacement of some 80,000 refugees from Blue Nile alone into 
South Sudan.21   
 
The population of South Sudan has extremely high expectations as to 
independence and the role of UNMISS in ‘delivering peace’.22 There 
is a genuine risk of rising tensions if expectations are not met – or if 
people perceive that peace dividends are being shared unequally. As 
one of our CA interlocutors explained, ‘[t]he population is a bit nega-
tive, they think we’re not doing enough. (…) They want to see some-
thing tangible. Soft development in the form of workshops is not 
enough’.23 Thus, the UN is facing challenges on all levels. The next 
section offers a short introduction to the UN and its peacekeeping en-
gagement in the Sudan and South Sudan.  
Brief introduction on UN peacekeeping history in the Sudans  
The UN Security Council first established a special political mission, 
the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) of 11 
June 2004,24 mandated with facilitating contacts with between the 
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) and to prepare for the introduction of an envisaged UN peace 
support operation.25 
 
On 9 January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was 
signed by the government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liber-
ation Movement/Army in Naivasha, Kenya, ending more than 20 
years of war. The CPA included provisions on security arrangements, 
power-sharing, some autonomy for the south, and more equitable dis-
                                                 
19  Conflict was raging in Pibor in Jonglei State, where members of the Lou Nuer tribe were 
pursuing members of the Murle tribe in cattle-raiding revenges. One thousand people 
were reported to have been killed according to various news outlets, although this was not 
confirmed by the UN. For more, see BBC, ‘South Sudanese flee to escape deadly ethnic 
vendetta’. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16381579, accessed 10 
January 2012.  
20  Abyei was expected to hold a referendum on whether to be part of the Sudan or South 
Sudan prior to secession. Similarly, popular consultations about the future of their states 
had also been planned in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, before the split.  
21  MSF, South Sudan: Window of opportunity closing fast to provide assistance to 80,000 
Sudanese refugees from Blue Nile state. Available at:  
http://www.msf.org/msf/articles/2012/03/south-sudan-window-of-opportunity-
closing.cfm  
22  Most interviews with local leaders and population pointed at the role of UNMISS in re-
sponding to improved security, jobs and access to basic services.   
23  Interview with national CA officer, Torit.   
24  Established by UNSC resolution 1547 (2004) of 11 June 2004. 
25  A joint AU–UN mission – UNAMID – has also been established for Darfur, but this will 
not be discussed in this report. 
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tribution of economic resources, including oil.26 While the parties es-
tablished the unity of the Sudan as a priority under the agreement, a 
six-and-a-half-year interim period was set up during which transitional 
institutions would govern the country and international monitoring 
mechanisms would be established and operationalized. As per the 
CPA, a referendum to determine the status of Southern Sudan (unity 
or secession) would be held at the end of this interim period.  
 
The UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) was established on 24 March 
2005 by UNSC Resolution 1590 (2005). It was tasked with supporting 
the parties in implementing the CPA, including facilitating and coor-
dinating, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the 
voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and hu-
manitarian assistance; assisting the parties in the mine action sector; 
and contributing towards international efforts to protect and promote 
human rights in the Sudan. 
 
At the referendum held in January 2011, the overwhelming majority – 
98.83% of those voting – chose independence.27 The Sudanese author-
ities were responsible for the referendum process, backed up by on 
UN logistical and technical assistance to the CPA parties’ referendum 
preparations.  
 
With the declaration of independence for South Sudan on 9 July 2011, 
the UNMIS mandate expired and was replaced by the United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) through UNSC resolution 1996 
(2011). This new mission was mandated to consolidate peace and se-
curity and help establish the conditions for development, with a view 
to strengthening the capacity of the government of the Republic of 
South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish 
good relations with its neighbours. UNMISS is arguably the first UN 
mission to have a strong local-level mandate with a specific focus on 
local-level peacebuilding.    
Uncertain transition 
It has been understandably difficult for most South Sudanese to follow 
the changes in missions and their mandates, from UNAMIS to 
UNMIS now to UNMISS. The shift in mandate and mission has re-
mained unclear not only to members of local governments and the 
populace, but to UNMISS staff itself, with implications for general 
expectations as to the role of the UN in the country.  
                                                 
26  Great uncertainties still remain after the independence of South Sudan as regards how the 
Abyei area should be divided. An Ethiopian force – the United Nations Interim Security 
Force for Abyei (UNISFA) – has been deployed to stabilize and secure the area, under 
UN Security Council Resolution 1990. UN, S/RES/1990, 27 June 2011.  
27  UNMIS website, ‘Referendum on Southern Sudan’, Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/referendum.shtml  
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At the time of our visit, the overall mission concept note was still be-
ing revised and sent between Juba and New York. There was frequent 
confusion at HQ level, and even more so at field level. One senior CA 
officer suggested that this could be due in part to the shift from Chap-
ter VI to VII in the mandate of the mission,28 and the reluctance of the 
GoSS to accept this.29 According to this officer, not even military 
troops and observers were clear on this shift in the mandate. The Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) had visited all 
state capitals and arranged meetings with members of government and 
civil society, who were therefore able to explain the shift in the man-
date, but greater efforts were required by the Public Information Of-
fice (PIO) to communicate the message to the population.    
                                                 
28  According to the conventional interpretation of the UN Charter, a Chapter VII-mandated 
mission can be more robust and if necessary use force against non-strategic actors and 
groups to enforce its mandate and to protect civilians. See NYU CIC, Robust 
Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force, ed. J. Nealin Parker, vol. 2011 (New York: Center 
on International Cooperation, New York University, 2009); UN, Draft DPKO/DFS 
Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping  (New York: United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support, 2010).  
29  Interview with senior CA officer, Juba. 
Contextualizing early peacebuilding 
to local circumstances – findings from 
South Sudan 
1. Brief introduction to civil affairs in South Sudan 
Civil affairs (CA) is one of the largest civilian components in UN 
peacekeeping, with 1009 staff members mandated and 870 staff de-
ployed globally to facilitate the implementation of peacekeeping man-
dates at the subnational level.30 The Policy Directive on Civil Affairs 
establishes three main roles for CA components, depending on the 
mandate and the stage of mandate implementation:31 
 
 cross-mission representation, monitoring and facilitation at the 
local level; 
 confidence-building, conflict management and support to rec-
onciliation; and  
 support to the restoration and extension of state authority. 
 
The Civil Affairs Division (CAD) in South Sudan is focused on con-
flict management and extension of state authority at the local level, 
although it also plays a significant part in cross-mission representa-
tion, monitoring and facilitation. The CAD mandate has not been 
greatly affected by the shift from UNMIS to UNMISS, although, as 
also with the status of the general mission concept note, there was as 
of yet no CA-specific concept note nor work-plan at the time of our 
visit. However, each region had already begun preparing its own spe-
cific work-plan based on strategic priorities and the local context. 
2. Civil affairs and local-level engagement 
By their very nature, peacekeeping missions operate side by side with 
and in support of a host government, at national, state and local levels. 
The government is always the primary interlocutor and partner of a 
UN mission. The UN operates under the basic peacebuilding premise 
that it is there in order to establish security and the underlying condi-
tions for the government to establish the rule of law and improve the 
delivery of basic services and development activities. The UN may 
often take local government and its legitimacy for granted. While this 
                                                 
30  Including professional national and international officers and UN Volunteers. UN 2012. 
Civil Affairs Staffing January 2012. UN DPKO, New York.   
31  DPKO/Department of Field Services 2008. Policy Directive on Civil Affairs. 
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may be a pragmatic result of the UN’s need to engage in a particular 
country and context, which necessarily requires the cooperation of the 
host government, it may also limit wider engagement with other ac-
tors. In South Sudan, most CA officers spend much of their time 
working with government. Notwithstanding, CAD has also looked to 
support customary (traditional) authorities, religious organizations and 
other community-based organizations (CBOs) in their conflict resolu-
tion work, acknowledging their importance in the social fabric of the 
young nation.  
 
Linking logistical support to political analysis 
UNMISS is a political mission and CAD has a political role at the lo-
cal level. Its work focuses primarily on collection and analysis of in-
formation on localized conflict dynamics, and providing the govern-
ment with logistical support ‘in doing their job’.32 CAD support large-
ly focuses on practical aspects of conflict resolution in the form of 
transporting government officials and other relevant stakeholders such 
as representatives of Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and local 
church organizations to peace conferences and related events in isolat-
ed parts of the country,33 as well as assisting in organizing those meet-
ings, particularly in relation to conflict management. As explained by 
one CA officer,  
 
One of the follow-ons from the old mission is to move the government around. 
CA is strong in transporting the governor and his advisors. But we don’t partici-
pate greatly. A lot of the work we do is allowing the government to do their job. 
We then sit backstage. Sometimes we feel like ‘travel agents’. Even when we 
bring individuals together, we are able to pre-empt their next moves because 
we’re able to understand the dynamics.34 
 
By being ‘close to the action’, CAD has a privileged position close to 
government officials on state and local levels in responding to local 
conflicts. CAD has a limited advisory role and operates mostly behind 
the scene at events, facilitating meetings and supporting the parties. 
As observed by one CA officer in Upper Nile State, ‘On our own, 
we’re not leading any efforts, we had no mandate to do that before 
anyway. We’re providing capacity and support. In most cases we 
sound the early warning.’35 
  
                                                 
32  This expression came up regularly with several CA officers interviewed. 
33  For a good study of how the UN can partner with religious actors and churches for local 
peacebuilding, see I.M. Breidlid and A. Stensland 2011. ‘The UN Mission and Local 
Churches in South Sudan: Opportunities for Partnerships in Local Peacebuilding’, Con-
flict Trends, 3/2011. ACCORD; Durban.  
34  Interview with CA officer, Malakal. 
35  Ibid. 
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Although there were some exceptions, most government authorities 
regarded the role of CA and UNMISS more broadly as providing lo-
gistical support and transport. This type of logistical support is critical 
in a country that is roughly the size of France yet has only 100 kilome-
tres of paved roads36 – and the rainy season prevents most travel be-
tween state capitals and the rest of the territory. The CAD use mission 
assets (like helicopters and boats) as their added-value, and as a tool 
for their peace facilitation and advisory work. 
 
Working with local institutional actors37 
Most interviewees reported that relations between CA and government 
officials on the state and local levels were as fairly positive, but we 
noted significant differences in the two field offices visited. For ex-
ample, all members of the CAD in Upper Nile State reported that they 
had the direct telephone numbers of the state governor and other sen-
ior-level state officials, and close working relations with local authori-
ties. By contrast, in Eastern Equatoria State the CAD was not author-
ized by the state coordinator to have direct access to the local authori-
ties, particularly those above their own hierarchical level: that greatly 
restricted the ability of CA officers to conduct their job,38 like collect-
ing information and supporting the government in its work. While this 
has largely to do with individual personalities (e.g. relations between 
the state governor and the UNMISS state coordinator), it made CAD 
work potentially isolated from wider events. 
 
Nevertheless, the approach taken by CAD in the two states visited was 
where CA personnel act backstage, seeking encourage the government 
to act in certain ways. To judge from our fieldwork in Haiti and in 
South Sudan, national professional officers are regarded by both CA 
colleagues and local stakeholders as being those with the closest rela-
tionships to local authorities and thus able to exert significant influ-
ence on policy processes: 39   
    
We push the government to do their job, but we don’t ever lead. We use a carrot 
and stick approach, we try to push them in the right direction. We push them by 
chatting with them, building good relationships, but let them feel they’re doing 
things and coming up with ideas. We don’t take the lead.40 
 
                                                 
36  International Monetary Fund 2011. South Sudan Faces Hurdles as World's Newest Coun-
try. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2011/car071811a.htm ac-
cessed 22 December 2011. 
37  In this report, the term ‘institutional actors’ refers mostly to local government, while the 
‘non-institutional actors’ are civil society organizations and traditional authorities.   
38  Interviews with several CA officers. 
39  The team visited Haiti and MINUSTAH in a prior field research period for the same pro-
ject. 
40  Interview with national CA officer, Malakal.  
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The statement also highlights the challenges that peacekeepers face in 
trying to get their local counterparts to take the lead and assume own-
ership in programming and implementing activities. As sown by the 
statement quoted above, the UN is struggling between seeking to con-
trol the direction and actions of their counterparts, while at the same 
time trying to maintain the sense of ownership of the very same activi-
ties.41  
 
Privileging relationships with institutional actors, as the UN tends to 
do, is not an easy task and can complicate or even prevent the organi-
zation from engaging with other stakeholders, be they opposition par-
ties or rebel groups. Broad engagement is a necessary feature of CA 
work, and can be critical in local-level development. In South Sudan, 
as in many other states, the governing party (here: the SPLM) seeks to 
maintain the leading position it gained through the struggle for inde-
pendence. This can put the UN and CA in a difficult position: ‘It’s 
hard for us, we’re by very nature meant to be neutral and non-partisan. 
But South Sudan is effectively a one-party state. If opposition parties 
are perceived as a threat, they get destroyed by SPLM.’42  
 
Despite its constitution, South Sudan remains a de facto one-party 
state, its government reluctant to involve non-state actors into the 
power sphere and discussion. One CA officer shared his frustrations 
with us: 
  
We [CA UNMISS] have to be neutral but the government gets pissed off when 
we show up with SPLM-DC or other opposition parties. We’re accused of sup-
porting the opposition. I’ve been at an SPLA garrison where I’ve been verbally 
attacked by SPLA officials because of it. We’re providing a forum for negotia-
tion and good offices, which is what we’re supposed to do.  But it doesn’t go 
down well, spending time with ‘rebels’.43 
 
Despite their cordial relationship and the logistical support facilitated 
by CA, the current working environment prevents CA and the gov-
ernment from engaging in a real working partnership. Some CA offic-
ers echoed the lack of trust between the two sets of actors. One officer 
confided, ‘there’s an element of suspicion between the government 
and UNMISS (…) there’s an information impasse.’ He went on to add 
that the government ‘only come to us [CAD] when they need our help, 
and we don’t share all our reports with them either. To me it would 
make sense to have a CA officer in the state office.’44  
 
                                                 
41  SPLM-DC is chaired by Lam Akol, a former SPLM official with close ties to Khartoum.  
42  Interview with CA officer, Malakal. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid. 
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Other organizations, among them the UNDP and AECOM,45 focus 
their local peacebuilding work on institutional actors, albeit with a dif-
ferent and arguably more successful approach that promotes greater 
trust between organizations and government.46 Both organizations 
have embedded staff within government offices at the state level. The 
UNDP has UN Volunteers (UNVs) integrated in the Ministry of Local 
Governance and Law Enforcement in all ten states, who also provide 
technical advice to the State Peace and Reconciliation Committee, 
which is the state organ that spearheads peace activities in various 
conflicting communities. Through its ‘Community Security and Arms 
Control’ (CSAC) project, the UNDP has also undertaken extensive 
community-level consultations on community priorities and needs:47  
 
We reach down, send roots to the ground (…) we do consultations, go to county 
level, because most international community support has focused on national in-
stitutions. We invite at local level to hear women leaders, youth leaders, religious 
leaders, traditional leaders and local authorities, police… So, using PRA [Partic-
ipatory Rural Appraisal] tools and methodology, we sit and do a conflict analysis 
– who is involved in the conflicts, who are the victims, root causes, the trends, 
consequences, etc. Based on this, in their own wisdom, what are their priorities 
and what would they do to resolve these.48  
 
AECOM has state advisors placed in the governors’ offices of all ten 
states, with direct regular access to the governor. Indicative of the po-
tential and recognized ability of CA, seven out of the ten state advi-
sors are former CA officers. According to one state advisor, ‘the work 
we [state advisors] do is exactly that of CA but more effective, since it 
doesn’t have DPKO rules and limitations.’ He went on to provide 
some examples where CA officers come for quick meetings and leave 
soon after, whereas AECOM or UNDP staff are permanently based in 
government, building trust and confidence and better able to influence 
processes.  
 
Although one senior CA officer in Juba mentioned she always advised 
her staff to make use of AECOM officers (former CA officer col-
leagues) strategically placed in governors’ offices throughout the ten 
states, as a way of gaining access and trust, this will still only give 
limited access for CA. The leverage enjoyed by the UNDP and 
AECOM through co-locating their staff within government structures 
is high and relatively cheap compared to the access and leverage that 
CA can achieve. According to the same senior CA officer, the gov-
                                                 
45  AECOM, a US private company financed by USAID, has been engaged in peace work in 
South Sudan since 2007. Although it has been doing what most interviewees considered 
‘very good work’, USAID did not renew their contract. Interview with AECOM peace 
advisor Upper Nile State, Malakal. 
46  This is based on interviews with government officials where they spoke with great famili-
arity about AECOM and UNDP in both states visited. 
47  See UNDP 2011. ‘Community Security and Arms Control in Southern Sudan’. Available 
at http://www.sd.undp.org/projects/s_cp2.htm, accessed 14 November 2011. 
48  Interview with UNDP official, Juba.  
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ernment had been very reluctant to have UN staff embedded in its 
ministries during the former UNMIS, explaining that it would create 
parallel structures, and thus CAD did not make use of this option.49 
The UNDP, however, had several senior officers embedded in a range 
of central-level ministries and over 100 UNVs in the ten states.50 We 
would argue that the UN would do well to operate with a hybrid sys-
tem where both UNDP and CA officers could be co-located with local 
officials, improving the impact of the organization. However, it may 
also be possible to improve internal cooperation between the UNDP 
and CA, so that the variations in access and co-location could be sort-
ed out without CA actually locating staff within ministries. One possi-
ble model would be to co-locate CA officers on local levels, and 
UNDP officers on state levels and up. 
Working with non-institutional actors 
The current peacebuilding model accords to civil society a prominent 
role in the overall response to sustainable peace, as regards scholars as 
well as practitioners. Most UN and INGO policies now have projects 
to support and strengthen local civil society, and these are seen as a 
means and a condition for sustainable peace. Local civil society or-
ganizations (CSOs) have increasingly become the implementing arm 
and the objective of many peacebuilding interventions.51  
 
Peacebuilding policies with a considerable focus on civil society have 
also been accused of bypassing the strengthening of local state author-
ities, even though the latter might not be present at all or have little 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people.52 Predictably, our government 
interviewees emphasized the need for the UN and other international 
actors to work alongside the government, whereas CSO interviewees 
stressed the importance of engaging with CSOs and CBOs to truly 
reach the population. In both states visited, the team heard several 
success stories of CA support to local CSOs, such as the ones below:53  
                                                 
49  In addition, it was also explained that if CA officers were to be embedded they would 
answer directly to the government, and CAD as it were was already short on staff. 
50  This number is expected to rise to 180 UNVs located in the ministries in all ten states, 
through the UNDP ‘support to states’ programme. Interview with UNDP official, Juba. 
51  D. Hillhorst and M. van Leeuwen, 2005. ‘Grounding local peace organisations: a case 
study of southern Sudan, Journal of Modern African Studies, 43, 4, pp. 537–563. 
52  S. Crowther, 2001. ‘The Role of NGOs, local and international, in post-war peacebuild-
ing’, Committee for Conflict Transformation Support, CCTS Newsletter 15.  
53  For a critical discussion of the term ‘civil society organization’ applied to the African 
context see D. Lewis, 2002. ‘Civil Society in African Contexts: Reflections on the useful-
ness of a concept’, Development and Change, 33(4): pp. 569–586.  
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Civil affairs support to the Peace Actors Forum in Upper Nile 
State54 
The Peace Actors Forum was established in 2009 with the support of 
the civil affairs division to coordinate all activities related to peace 
taking place in the state. Currently under the purview of the Peace 
Commission which exists at national level, the Peace Actors Forum in 
Upper Nile State includes national and international actors operating 
in the sphere of peace and reconciliation,  such as the Council of El-
ders, the South Sudan Council of Churches, the Disarmament, Demo-
bilization and Reintegration Commission, the South Sudan Small 
Arms Control, the Women’s Association for Peace and Development, 
UNMISS civil affairs, UNDP, Pact Sudan, and Care International. 
 
The coordination forum was established after the civil affairs divison 
started receiving many similar requests for assistance from various 
organizations involved in peace work. While at its inception, CAD 
had a central role, the Peace Commission has now taken the lead in 
organizing meetings and getting organizations together, while still re-
lying on the support of UNMISS. The Acting Director of the Forum 
explained that whenever ‘an incident takes place, I call an emergency 
meeting and we [organizations] can plan together’, meeting in case of 
emergencies but otherwise regularly on a twice a month basis. In the 
words of the acting-director: 
 
      UNMIS always helps us. We achieve some important things in the state. At one 
point, we were organizing a Peace Conference, including people from Unity and 
Jonglei, before the referendum. We planned for around 250 people, which would 
bring together all politicians and leaders, opposition parties. The list of delegates 
had been given to UNMIS and everything was ready. At the last minute, the na-
tional government in Juba cancelled with the excuse that this could divide people 
before the referendum … We had three main topics of discussion, unity in Upper 
Nile; land disputes and relationship between SPLA and civilians. The govern-
ment didn’t want to discuss with rebel groups and opposition parties, and this 
was very disappointing.55 
 
This case also demonstrates the challenges in attempting to engage 
with non-institutional actors in the context of South Sudan and the re-
luctance of the government to bring together opposition parties. 
 
 
                                                 
54  Interviews with the Peace Actors Forum acting director and with CA officer, Malakal. 
55  Interview with the Peace Actors Forum acting director, Malakal. 
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Civil affairs support to the establishment of the Youth Forum and 
Civil Society Network in Eastern Equatoria State56  
 
The Eastern Equatoria State Youth Forum was set up in August 2010 
with the support of one national CA officer. Although the youth had 
initiated several community-based organizations (CBOs) throughout 
the state, they had remained unable to voice their concerns and come 
together as a group. As the CA officer explained: ‘I started telling 
them – ‘We call you civil society. But if you don’t unite you can’t talk 
to the government. If you approach the government as a group, they 
will listen to you.’57 From here, a united youth forum was established. 
The CA officer assisted in registration and procedures, and although 
the Forum is still in its infancy, it has worked with Pact Sudan on civ-
ic education and UNDP during the referendum as a means to engage 
youth.58  
 
Similarly, CAD also assisted in establishing the Eastern Equatoria 
Civil Society Network for regular meetings of Eastern Equatorian lo-
cal NGOs.59   
 
Historically, the 1980s saw a proliferation of NGOs in the South as a 
response to the presence of international aid agencies that required 
local CSOs to work with.60 Although umbrella organizations such as 
the Youth Forum of Eastern Equatoria, the Civil Society Network or 
the Peace Actors Forum are still in a nascent stage, they are promising 
interlocutors for community actors to engage with the government in a 
unified and structured manner. However, it is also worth reflecting on 
whether such local organizations are in fact representative of the 
communities – and what influence and legitimacy they have on the 
ground. At present, local churches are the most important civil society 
actors in South Sudan, whereas the international community (non-
faith based) has been providing support mainly to small secular CBOs 
that have little influence among the local population. 
 
                                                 
56  Interview with the chairman of the Youth Forum in Eastern Equatoria State; chairman of 
the Civil Society Network of Eastern Equatoria State and with national CA officer, Torit. 
57  Interview with national CA officer, Torit. 
58  We use the term youth aware of its multiple identities and voices, ranging from educated 
urban youth to less accessible and widely illiterate and marginalized youth from villages 
and cattle camps. Sommers and Schwartz (2011) highlight how the civil war has led to 
three new identities for South Sudanese youth: 1) those who remained in South Sudan 
during the war; 2) IDPs who fled to Khartoum, known negatively as ‘Jalaba’ (Arabs); and 
3) ‘diaspora youth’, referring to those who fled to East Africa. For a good analysis of the 
complexity and specific challenges facing South Sudanese youth see M. Sommers and S. 
Schwartz, 2011. Dowry and Division: Youth and State Building in South Sudan, USIP 
Special Report November 2011.     
59  Interview with national CA officer and chairman of the Network, Torit. 
60  H.Abdel Ati, 2006. ‘Untapped potential: civil society and the search for peace’, Concilia-
tion Resources, available at: http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/civil-society.php.   
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Recommendations 
 Consider embedding/co-locating CA officers in relevant local-level 
government offices, in coordination with UNDP and AECOM;  
 Continue to support an inclusive dialogue with the political opposi-
tion;  
 Encourage local government authorities to work with customary 
authority structures, including inviting them to meetings, ceremo-
nies;  
 Make use of local churches, CBOs and CSOs to reach out to the 
population and village level. 
 
3.  Can local actors influence national decision-making  
processes? 
Gap between centre and periphery 
As in many post-conflict countries where the state is nearly entirely 
absent from rural areas and there is a wide divide between the centre 
and periphery, South Sudan is no exception. Given that until the coun-
try’s recent independence, Juba was considered periphery in relation 
to Khartoum, it is no surprise that there are huge challenges in redu-
cing the gap between the current political, administrative and econo-
mic centre – Juba – and the rest of the country. The notion of centre-
periphery is also applicable to state capitals and the rest of their terri-
tories. The government is present at national and state levels, albeit 
with weak capacity. On the county level there is nearly a complete 
lack of state presence and infrastructure, while below the county level 
(payam and boma) only informal structures exist. The principle of de-
centralization has been more in word than action. Most power and re-
sources are located in the centre – in Juba, and to a lesser extent at the 
state levels. As articulated by a UNDP official of the conflict preven-
tion and recovery unit (CPRU) involved in community-level consulta-
tions:  
 
People in communities have never seen their government. In Khartoum time, the 
government was limited to the county. During the war, there was total chaos. 
And now post-independence, government is sitting in state capitals. There are no 
peace dividends to be seen. No schools, no roads, no hospitals, at community 
level. At community level what has kept communities together are the chiefs, 
who have held legislative, administrative and judicial power. The social contract 
that should tie the government to communities simply isn’t there.61  
 
                                                 
61  Interview with UNDP official, Juba. 
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The divide between the core (centre) and the periphery in the (old) 
Sudan has historically been very deep, and local institutional and non-
institutional actors have barely been connected to the centre, let alone 
able to influence national decision-making.62 The South Sudan nation-
al government remains authoritarian in nature and extractive in its 
economic pursuits. There is little tolerance for dissent, nor real interest 
in consultations. One should keep in mind that most officials on all 
levels in the government and administration have a history of partici-
pating actively in the civil war, and very often as military officers in 
the SPLA. The military influence on the administration is thus enor-
mous and it will be a great challenge to start changing the combative 
and zero-sum mindset that pervades the current administration of 
South Sudan towards a more conciliatory and inclusive government.     
  
The core idea behind the centre-periphery argument is that ‘central 
elites seek control over the resources of the country by exploiting the 
natural resources of the periphery (farmland, oil) and the labour of its 
inhabitants, also gaining profits from trade in the provinces, while in-
vesting its capital only in the centre’.63 This framework can assist in 
conceptualizing not only the history, but the present and future of 
South Sudan. The new capital Juba, a previously provincial periphery 
has which has now become ‘the centre’, is now employing many of 
the same predatory measures it was previously victim of, such as ma-
nipulation of local conflicts and politicization of inter-communal ten-
sions. A centre-periphery analysis also helps to understand the succes-
sive waves of international involvement in the Sudan from the coloni-
al period until now, where the periphery is largely ignored, in relation 
to greater emphasis given to national dimensions.64 In broader terms, 
it can also be used to frame the post-CPA international peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding presence in the country that has overwhelmingly 
been based in provincial capitals and emphasized liberal understand-
ings of peace. UNMISS’s attempts to assist government presence and 
performance at county level through the County Support Bases 
(CSBs) may be a promising step in the right direction, to be discussed 
in the next section.  
UN support to narrowing the gap 
Supporting local actors’ influence national decision-making processes 
and establishing links between the national and local-level dimensions 
are hence extremely challenging yet necessary features of CA’s work. 
If decision-processes are to be duly informed of the needs from the 
                                                 
62  For a good overall historical background see D. Johnson, 2011. The root causes of Su-
dan’s civil wars, Oxford: James Currey.  
63  A. De Waal, 2007. Sudan: What kind of state? What kind of crisis?, Occasional Paper 
No.2 London: London School of Economics, Crisis States Research Centre, p.6.  
64  See also Edward Thomas, 2011. ‘The Past & Future of Peace’ in  I. Ryle, J. Willis, S. Bal-
do and J.M. Jok (eds.) The Sudan Handbook, Woodbridge: James Currey.   
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ground up, it is important to encourage national decision-making or-
gans and politicians to listen to local actors as much as supporting lo-
cal actors in having a coherent message in voicing their concerns. The 
UN and CA can play an important role in this work, both at central 
and local levels. In Juba, senior CA officers can develop relationships 
with counterparts in relevant ministries as well as guiding the SRSG 
and other senior officials of the UN who can weigh in at the political 
level. 
 
At the local level, CSAC consultations aim to contribute to the crea-
tion of a social contract between the government and the people. The 
consultations have been done jointly by UNDP with CAD, yet accord-
ing to the CSAC project manager, ‘the whole consultation process is 
not done by UNDP, it’s the South Sudan Peace Commission and the 
South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Arms Control, part 
of the Ministry of Interior.’65 UNDP has provided training in PRA 
methods to ministry staff who then train people at the county level that 
can conduct the consultations in local languages. From there, depend-
ing on the issues identified at local level, various ministries are in-
volved. For example, if food security is identified as a conflict factor, 
then the ministry of agriculture is involved. By the time of our field 
research, consultations had been completed in Eastern Equatoria, 
Jonglei and Upper Nile, and were about to start in Unity, Lakes and 
Warrap states.  
 
UNDP aims to act as the messenger between the community and the 
state through the CSAC, which could be the start of a relationship 
built on trust where communities identify their concerns and their 
government acts upon these.66 Community priorities are also shared 
with other stakeholders who may want to work at county level.  Yet 
most importantly, the consultations open up ‘entry points’: ‘Commu-
nities look at themselves as tribes, yet responses come regionally to 
the whole country.’67 According to the CSAC project manager, 
  
This is still early days, but this is where conflict transformation comes from. We 
support the Peace Commission focusing on a peace strategy, which can involve 
mediation teams, peace cadres, etc. This is a process, of continued change and 
requiring flexibility with a learn-by-doing approach. Look at many aspects, live-
lihood issues, issues of culture, how to change the mindset. There is no one right 
approach to get it right. What we get from the consultations feeds into the Sudan 
Stabilization Fund.68 
                                                 
65  Interview with UNDP official, Juba. 
66  See UNDP 2011. ‘Community Security and Arms Control in Southern Sudan’. Available 
at http://www.sd.undp.org/projects/s_cp2.htm, accessed 14 November 2011. 
67  Interview with UNDP official, Juba. 
68I nterview with UNDP official, Juba. 
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Recommendations 
 Press for a more participatory approach among national decision-
making organs and politicians, through the SRSG on the strategic 
level and CA officers on the operational and tactical levels 
 Make sure that the CSBs contribute to feeding local voices into na-
tional policy processes, including youth, civil society and tradition-
al authorities  
 Continue and expand the cooperation between UNDP and CAD on 
CSAC consultations and use the presence of the CSBs to expand 
these to the county level as well.  
4.  The UN and local peacebuilding – moving from civil affairs 
to County Support Bases 
 
This section will look more closely at the role of civil affairs in terms 
of facilitating access to service provision, whether from national au-
thorities or other actors. It will also sketch out the main tenets of the 
County Support Bases (CSBs) now being established across South 
Sudan, and how these are expected to function.  
Decentralizing the UN  
The UN mission has realized that the work it does at local levels re-
quires flexibility. For this reason it is focused on decentralizing au-
thority to the state coordinator level, and further to the subsections be-
low the state level. The two field offices visited by our team differed 
in their approaches and understandings of how authority was decen-
tralized, although there appears to be a policy of decentralizing au-
thority to all states.  
 
The decision of UNMISS to decentralize its offices and focus atten-
tion at the subnational level was grounded in the realization that South 
Sudan’s greatest needs exist at the county and subcounty levels. Im-
portant here are the capacity and physical infrastructure limitations 
across South Sudan as well as the localized nature of conflicts:  
 
…our presence there, even without doing anything already has a great impact, 
people feel reassured. And when we’re around the government tries to be more 
present too. It would be even better if we could spend more time in payams and 
bomas.69 
 
The local level is also where there are fewer international organiza-
tions operating, and are hence where the UNMISS can have greatest 
                                                 
69  Interview with CA officer, Malakal. 
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impact can be greatest and most value added, according to one of our 
CA interlocutors:  
 
Let me tell you the truth, this mission, and especially CA, will find its added-
value at county level and below. In state capitals you’ll find UNDP, USAID, and 
others entrenched in ministries. Rather than start top–bottom, we should start at 
county towns and make it bottom–up. That’s where we’d find relevance and be 
useful.70   
 
Decentralization started already during the tenure of the previous 
SRSG during the UNMIS period. According to Sylvia Fletcher, who 
heads the newly established Recovery, Reintegration and Peacebuild-
ing (RRP) Section, there was an ambitious vision of the UN resident 
coordinator to establish Referendum Support Bases ahead of the refer-
endum in January 2011.71 Support was established in the ten states and 
in fourteen out of the seventy-nine counties. Some temporary 
presences were also established. Governors appointed county commis-
sioners; UNMIS provided considerable assistance, with logistics, 
transport and administrative support. Some visits by state authorities 
to the local level also got under way in the county offices during this 
period. 
 
Resident Coordinator Support Officers (RCSOs) were deployed to 
these presences, to liaise with and between humanitarian actors, na-
tional and local authorities. Among their tasks was to undertake as-
sessments including a survey in 237 of about 700 payams on liveli-
hoods, policing, and so forth, creating a baseline study which is the 
most comprehensive in South Sudan to date.72 The study focused on 
the payams with the highest number of returnees, assessing the ability 
of these communities to absorb the returnees. The RRP Section is a 
continuation of the RCSO liaison function, but is planned to take up 
other tasks as well. The baseline study of the payams serves as an im-
portant tool in planning the future activities of the section, which will 
undertake a mixture of tasks, as the title indicates. This baseline study 
will also be central to the work of the government and development 
actors when planning their future interventions across South Sudan.  
 
When questioned about the relationship between this section and the 
CAD, mission representatives emphasized the need to separate the 
task of conflict resolution that sits with CA from the wider peace-
building tasks that now fall under the RRP section:  
 
                                                 
70  Interview with CA officer, Torit. 
71  Sylvia Fletcher is the deputy to the Resident Coordinator and DSRSG Lise Grande. As 
such her position and the RRP section is located within the development pillar of the mis-
sion, but funded over the assessed budget. We will analyse the implications of this later in 
this report.   
72  Interview with Sylvia Fletcher, UNMISS, Juba. 
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UN Resident Coordinator Lise Grande is adamant about the separation between 
the mission and development and humanitarian actors. Civil affairs is not work-
ing enough in conflict resolution, mostly work on mitigation, but will do this in 
the future hopefully, as well as support the extension of state authority.73 
 
It was argued that CA officers lack the necessary background, as they 
do not have experience in development programming and delivery. 
However the RCSOs were originally CA officers who were later of-
fered new contracts when the RCSO posts received separate funding 
and were added to the staffing table.74 The rationale for adding 
RCSOs and RRPs to the staffing table was thus primarily political and 
grounded in the wish to maintain a separation between peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding/development tasks, as the quote above shows. Be-
cause of the separation of tasks, CA will continue to focus on conflict 
management in South Sudan.  
 
The previous UNMIS regional coordinator was successful in decentralizing the 
UN presence, by double-hatting the CA staff. These were called State Coordina-
tors back in 2009. They were further empowered in 2010 when these posts got 
their own funding. Half of the CA people stayed on board and changed their con-
tract, and another half came from other backgrounds.75  
 
As the RCSOs were already funded by assessed contributions to un-
dertake their liaison work, also the new RRP Section will be funded 
by assessed contributions, although it is located within the develop-
ment pillar of the mission and undertakes peacebuilding tasks. Ac-
cording to one senior UNMISS official, the SRSG had been prepared 
to argue with member states on the importance of budgeting for de-
centralization, but found that she did not have to.76 UNMISS thus rep-
resents an important and new feature of peacekeeping operations, as it 
has formal funding to peacebuilding activities through the RRP Sec-
tion.  
County Support Bases – a portal and a platform for peacebuild-
ing? 
The RRP Section will be coordinating the County Support Bases 
(CSBs). Most UN peacekeeping operations today have an impressive 
reach in the countries where they are deployed, but UNMISS is aim-
ing to stretch even further and with a much wider scope. Apart from 
being present in all ten state capitals, UNMISS plans to have a pres-
ence at county levels selected on the basis of level of conflict and iso-
lation, in an attempt to provide support to conflict management and 
the expansion of state authority presence and to build local capacities.  
                                                 
73  Senior UNMISS official.  
74  Ibid. 
75  Ibid. 
76  Ibid. 
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The CSBs are built upon the model of the referendum support bases 
that became semi-permanent after the referendum and were seen as a 
positive addition to the UN mission. After extensive consultations the 
mission decided to have County Support Bases in many of the coun-
ties. The new staffing table authorizes a total of 35 CSBs and 10 re-
gional state offices. This entails considerable challenges, in logistics 
not least, but will increase the presence on the ground of UNMISS 
significantly across the entire territory of South Sudan. There will be 
29 presences in the course of 2012 (10 states and 19 counties), and the 
remaining 16 CSBs will be completed during the next two financial 
years by summer 2014. The locations are selected according to: 1) 
conflict-proneness; 2) potential as economic hub; and 3) predomi-
nance of returnee populations/refugees. They will be staffed by CA 
officers, RRP officers, human rights officers, UN Police and adminis-
trative officers.77  
 
The key feature of the CSBs is the principle of co-location with local 
authorities, with equal facilities and the same standards. The CSBs are 
to comply with UN security regulations, have water, solar-powered 
electricity, internet and basic services infrastructure. These will be ac-
cessible to UN and local authorities, and their buildings will be of the 
same standard. Each CSB is to consist of small enabling infrastruc-
ture, with a large tucol as an assembly area for about 100 persons, a 
community development centre – a meeting place for activities, hard-
wall classroom-sized multi-purpose centres, a borehole for water, sat-
ellite internet, and a battery of toilets. When the UN leaves, the facili-
ties will be handed over in their entirety to the local authorities.  
 
The SRSG envisages that the CSBs will support the peacebuilding and 
state-building agenda by being a ‘portal and a platform’78 not only for 
the sections of UNMISS and local authorities, but also to facilitate the 
support of other development partners and CSOs: ‘UNICEF, ILO and 
others will through this be enabled to be in the field. RRP can top you 
up and help agencies have a presence on the county level implement-
ing development projects.’79 RRP officers will support local peace-
building with small-scale development projects like feeder roads, live-
lihoods projects, and small local markets, serving as a portal for com-
munity development by other actors as well: 
 
[UNMISS w]ill leverage the presence of [the] peacekeeping operation through 
the RRP [section]. RRP will be a platform for logistical support to local authori-
ties, and support the delivery of a development package consisting of, inter alia, 
literacy training, community development and youth payam services. It will also 
offer to be a platform (in addition to the UNCT) for the NGOs such as NPA, 
                                                 
77  Ibid. 
78  Interview with SRSG Hilde Johnson, Juba. 
79  Interview with Sylvia Fletcher, Juba. 
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NCA, PACT, CRS80 and other NGOs who want to deliver basic services, capac-
ity development and development support, and who are not strongly against co-
operation with the mission. Initially there was scepticism, but there is now wide 
support.81 
 
At the time of our field research, UNDP had received $5.8 million for 
small-scale peacebuilding initiatives to be conducted in cooperation 
and under the leadership of the RRP officers. Again according to 
Fletcher, there will be no overheads on this money, as the presence is 
already there through the RRP officers funded by assessed contribu-
tions.82 This is an interesting feature of UNMISS – the RRP officers 
will be funded by the assessed budget of the peacekeeping mission, 
but will also facilitate peacebuilding and development activities. 
While this may not sound so surprising to people less familiar with 
UN rules and regulations, some member states may find this to be 
quite controversial. Generally, UN mission staff paid over the as-
sessed budget are expected to deal with peacekeeping tasks, and there 
has been growing concern among the development funds, programmes 
and agencies of the UN as to what might be seen as the ‘mission 
creep’ of UN peacekeeping operations, engaging in early peacebuild-
ing such as supporting capacity-building in rule of law and other sec-
tors. However, we would argue that these funds may be well spent – 
enabling the UN to better cover the local-level ‘peacebuilding gap’ 
and in principle enabling local authorities and other actors to deliver 
real peace dividends to the local people.  
QIPs and finances 
Another noteworthy feature of UNMISS is the recent transfer of re-
sponsibility for Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) from CA to the RRP 
section. For civil affairs, this will means a lot more time to focus on 
their core tasks, as QIPs generally involve considerable amounts of 
administrative work.83 According to Sylvia Fletcher, the RRP Section 
has a comparative advantage in implementing the QIPs: ‘Comparative 
advantage here is the heritage of the RCSOs – they are seen as team 
players by the UNCTs and can link up with the funds, programmes 
and agencies.’84 She also explained that they would narrow down the 
amount and type of QIPs that the mission would implement: ‘Ruth-
lessly only going to do certain QIPs, and standardize them. We will 
bring projects to scale, e.g. training of teachers. [We will] bridge the 
                                                 
80  Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Pact Sudan (PACT), 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS). 
81  Interview with SRSG Hilde Johnson, Juba.  
82  Interview with Sylvia Fletcher, Juba. 
83  In MINUSTAH in Haiti, we found that QIPs took more than 25% of CA staff time.  
84  Interview with Sylvia Fletcher, Juba. 
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gap between technical expertise and support on higher level and bring-
ing it out to the lower level.’85  
 
However, as civil affairs long have been responsible for most QIPs, 
they may feel that they are also losing an important source of leverage 
with the local community, as they have been able to complement their 
conflict management activities with small-scale projects, creating 
goodwill and mutually beneficial projects between conflicting com-
munities. ‘If you look at UNMIS projects, 60% have been sponsored 
by CA. Maybe even more. Here in Upper Nile State, 80% of projects 
are from CA. We’re able to put together projects and we have people 
within our ranks with a project management background.’86 
 
So how will the relationship between the CA and RRP sections of 
UNMISS and development agencies evolve? There is huge potential 
for UN agencies, particularly UNDP, but also other development part-
ners and CSOs/NGOs. One UNDP interlocutor informed the research 
team that the CSBs will provide accommodation and office space, al-
ready a significant benefit, to assist agencies in deploying staff at 
county level.87  
Innovation or duplication? 
Civil affairs is the section in UNMISS closest to community leader-
ship. As noted, it is the section that local actors usually get in touch 
with when they need the support of the UN mission. Apart from its 
contacts with local networks and understanding of local realities and 
dynamics, the strength of CA lies in its information-gathering abili-
ties. The mission has argued that it was necessary to add the RCSOs 
and later the RRPs to the staffing table because of the lack of a devel-
opment culture among CA officers and the need to keep conflict man-
agement separate from peacebuilding/developmental work. This may 
sound reasonable, but in fact the distinction is very blurred and it has 
serious cost implications.  
 
CA is expanding its presence across South Sudan and plans to have 
about 160 posts across the country in the course of 2012. RRP officers 
are being hired and sent out to every state office and CSB as well. The 
cumulative effect is a massive presence of UN peacekeeping officers 
throughout the country. With it follow great expectations, particularly 
as the promise of the SRSG is to make it possible for real peacebuild-
ing and developmental work to commence, including the deployment 
of local authorities.88 With the large-scale presence of the UN on the 
                                                 
85  Ibid. 
86  Interview with CA officer, Malakal. 
87  Interview with UNDP CSAC project manager, Juba. 
88  Interview with SRSG Hilde Johnson, Juba. 
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ground, expectations are bound to rise. This is a crucial point. The de-
ployment of young and inexperienced staff (mostly composed of 
UNVs) adds to this concern – as they are going to need to operate in 
extremely complex and politically sensitive situations. The close co-
operation with local authorities could also compromise the perceived 
impartiality and credibility of the UN mission, especially in cases 
where the local authorities are involved in a local conflict. This will 
require analytical skills, context-specific knowledge and experience. 
We examine this challenge further in the final section of the report. 
Cooperation with neighbouring countries to support capacity  
development 
To better support the development of national capacities on national 
and state levels, UNDP has initiated cooperation with the regional or-
ganization IGAD (Inter-governmental Authority on Development), 
comprising six countries in eastern Africa, with financial support from 
Norway. Through the IGAD initiative, 200 civil servants from minis-
tries in Ethiopia (60), Kenya (80) and Uganda (60) are to be seconded 
to national and state-level offices in South Sudan.89 This regional ex-
pertise appears well-suited to support the capacity needs in South Su-
dan. They have been co-located with South Sudanese officials in a ca-
pacity-transfer initiative which seems promising so far, particularly as 
it is strongly owned by its South Sudanese counterparts.90 The IGAD 
arrangement should be followed closely as a possible example for fu-
ture peace operations.  
 
The African Union (AU) is currently trying to gather funds to bolster 
the IGAD initiative and has envisaged setting up a new civil service 
training institution and the secondment of 1000 civil servants from 
AU member states. However, programme costs are estimated at ap-
proximately US$ 90 million, and the necessary funding has not yet 
been secured.91  
                                                 
89  Interview with UNDP officials, Juba. See also UNDP (2011), IGAD Regional Initiative 
for Capacity Enhancement in Southern Sudan. Available at  
http://www.sd.undp.org/projects/s_dg23.htm, accessed 22 December 2011.  
90  K.N. Tarp and F.F. Rosén (2011), ‘South Sudan: a new model for civilian capacity in 
post-conflict settings’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 6(2). 
91  The 200 civil servants seconded through IGAD are receiving their salaries from their 
home ministries. Administration, management and allowances are paid by Norway, and 
amount to approximately US$ 10 million. See Norway’s website in South Sudan (2011) 
Norway supports helping hands from neighbours,  
http://www.norway-sudan.org/News_and_events/CPA/Norway-supports-helping-hands-
from-neighbours/, accessed 22 December 2011.  
Moving towards local-level peacebuilding?    41 
 
41 
 
Recommendations 
 Share the baseline study undertaken in the payams with civil socie-
ty and other development actors to get their inputs and enable pro-
gramming for local-level peacebuilding and development  
 Ensure close cooperation in CSBs and on state and national levels 
between CA and the RRP section/UN country team  
 External evaluation of the CSBs after the first year of operation, to 
improve value for money, effectiveness, ownership among local 
stakeholders, and address possible unintended consequences  
 Review the implications of the transfer of QIPs from CA to the 
RRP officers after one year for effectiveness, comparative ad-
vantages, and possible unintended consequences 
 Follow up the IGAD initiative as a possible model for AU support, 
as well as for other UN missions, and to identify any unintended 
consequences.  
5. Promoting local ownership – the recurring challenge 
The IGAD case is a promising example of local ownership not least 
because it is founded on the needs and wishes of the government and 
officials of South Sudan. Among government officials and others the 
initiative is known as the ‘Government of South Sudan – IGAD initia-
tive’, with UNDP seen as a service provider paying allowances and 
facilitating logistical issues. This indicates the perceived strong own-
ership on behalf of the government and other South Sudanese stake-
holders.92  While local ownership is largely acknowledged as a pre-
condition for successful international support to local authorities, in 
practice there are various internal and external challenges facing that 
the UN when it engages with local actors. Staff operating at local level 
have developed strategies and ways to support the promotion of mul-
tiple voices, also by extending those voices within the mission as well 
as towards wider national political processes.   
External challenges 
As discussed above, it is challenging to bring local stakeholders into 
decision-making processes, particularly in a context like that of South 
Sudan as it surfaces from a long history of conflict and with a gov-
ernment that has emerged from and with a strong militarized structure. 
It also gives rise to the question of who the local actors are and how 
they are selected. Given the primacy of institutional actors, CA offic-
ers face huge challenges in trying to support non-institutional actors to 
gain influence on decision-making processes, at the local and national 
                                                 
92 Tarp and Rosén, South Sudan: a New Model, p. 3.  
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levels. The ethnic composition of the government, with the over-
whelming influence of the Dinka tribe, and the resultant level of polit-
ical manipulation, cannot be ignored, and is critical in re-igniting con-
flicts.93  
 
Civil affairs operates largely in the background providing logistical 
support to government. For example, when government officials re-
quest UNMISS’ support to travel to a remote area of the country on an 
official visit, it is to CA they turn to for assistance. One CA officer 
explained that a typical state government visit to a village might in-
clude the local county commissioner and an SPLA representative, if 
they are present in the area. Often head chiefs are not specifically in-
vited but they are easily recognizable.94 While the customary authori-
ties may not be comfortable speaking in the presence of government 
representatives, particularly in areas where ethnic identities might 
clash, CA officers mentioned they would always try to speak to these 
persons and hear their version of events and concerns. National pro-
fessional officers are in a unique position to approach customary au-
thorities and understand the dynamics of power and exclusion. 
 
CAD was often praised by local actors and UN staff for their infor-
mation-gathering abilities and sound political and conflict analysis, 
critical to understanding who local actors really are and their role in 
the local political economy. Most non-institutional actors we spoke 
with stressed the importance of inviting the youth, women and el-
ders/chiefs, blaming the frequent failure of peace conferences on ‘not 
involving the right people’.95 Young people are noticeable absent from 
such meetings, although these are often the ones who perpetrating the 
violence. As one South Sudanese academic argued:   
 
Now there’s a lot of talk of building peace, big meetings, workshops, a lot of 
talking, but sometimes they even invite the wrong people to these events. (…) 
They need more genuine processes and to involve the right local actors.96 
                                                 
93  It must be added that the regional composition of the new cabinet has been balanced ac-
cording to census results. However, some ethnic groups feel underrepresented and blame 
the Dinka (majority tribe) of dominating the government. This needs to be seen in relation 
to the civil war, when Dinkas dominated the SPLA (and after the CPA – many SPLA of-
ficers were given positions in the government as a reward for their efforts during the civil 
war). However, the perceived ‘Dinka dominance’ is a generalization and is often used to 
manipulate anti-Dinka and anti-government sentiments.  
94  It is important to distinguish between traditional authorities and government chiefs. See 
Markus V. Hoehne, 2008. Traditional Authorities and Local Government in Southern Su-
dan, Study supported by the World Bank as part of the ESW ‘Southern Sudan: Strength-
ening Good Governance for Development Outcomes in a Post-Conflict Setting’. 
95  Interview with chairman of the Youth Forum in Eastern Equatoria State, Torit. 
96  Interview with South Sudanese academic, Center for Peace and Development Studies, 
University of Juba, Juba. 
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Internal dimensions 
While it will take a long time to change the political culture of exclu-
sion in South Sudan inherited from the pre-secession phase, there are 
several internal challenges that CA officers must face in their jobs. 
These include the lack of a flexible work culture, seriously constrain-
ing security rules, a hierarchical chain of command and a donor-
driven agenda often disconnected from the reality in the field. One 
state coordinator (whose background was from civil affairs) asked,  
 
Why has it become so difficult to work in the current institutional setting on con-
flict transformation at grassroots level? That’s because those designing the rules 
have very little field experience. There are also problems with insurance compa-
nies and security.97  
 
Some CA officers argued that CAD’s intervention mechanisms tend to 
be set up mechanically and often cannot be developed in parallel. 
Sources of conflict and their dynamics have to be addressed before 
working on political space. One CA officer asked ‘…as for local state 
authority institutions, do they even exist? This mission has recognized 
this and it is the first time a mission has recognized a decentralized 
approach to conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding’.98 An-
other argued:  
 
[m]ost peace conferences are failing because there’s no local ownership. We 
come up with western ideas of conflict resolution and then impose them on 
communities. But they have good mechanisms, and should use them. Local own-
ership means involving the community at all stages of the process and identify-
ing their own problems. We don’t give people enough time to identify their prob-
lems. The big problem is that we’re not involving people in solving their own 
problems. There is a clash between government appointed chiefs and real heredi-
tary leaders/chiefs.99        
Bureaucratic nature of peacekeeping and security constraints  
The bureaucratized nature of peacekeeping operations renders CA 
work very difficult. Conflict facilitation requires flexible and quick 
responses, and may be seriously hampered by the hierarchical com-
mand structure in peacekeeping, and the many rules and regulations 
that both guide and constrain peacekeepers. Indeed, many peacekeep-
ers argue that their ability to move projects depends on their ability to 
bend the rules and find ways of using and ‘playing’ the system.  
 
One of the most commonly heard assertions from CA officers con-
cerned the extremely restrictive role of United Nations Department of 
Safety and Security (UNDSS). As expressed by one senior CA officer:  
 
                                                 
97  Interview with state coordinator and senior CA, Malakal. 
98  Ibid. 
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UN Security also makes it very difficult to go out in the field. During the war I 
could do all kinds of things with UN Security approval that I can no longer do. I 
was dropped with a radio set and a tent and stayed for weeks in the bush. Today 
no one walks, no tents. This means that we have no access and not the flexibility 
to go to the areas where there is the greatest need. And humanitarians, who are 
present in some locations, are reluctant to house UNMISS staff even if we are 
not accompanied by the military.100  
 
Also UNDP staff, like the UNVs embedded at state level, must follow 
security rules, although they tend to have greater autonomy. They are 
quartered in the UNMISS camp, often a little outside of the town, but 
have their regular workspace in the various state ministries where they 
are co-located and spend most of their time.    
 
Although not all government officials distinguished between UN sec-
tions, some attributed the limitations of CA support to the rigidity of 
UN bureaucracy: 
 
UNMISS has to always listen to our requests and interfere quickly. If any con-
flict arises, you need to act quickly; if you can get transport by air to access the 
place quickly. My understanding and complaints are not so much of CA as such, 
I know them well and trust them, but because of bureaucracy they need permis-
sions from Juba, the state coordinator, transport and military. With CA, I don’t 
have doubts that they always want to help but Movcon [UNMISS transport sec-
tion] at short notice or head of office stops them. I’m 100% sure CA is always on 
our side.101  
 
Although there is a UN mission policy on decentralization of authori-
ty, the individual personalities of state coordinators significantly in-
fluence the level of autonomy accorded to each CAD team. In some 
state offices, the state coordinator has restricted CA officers from 
gaining access to their government counterparts, insisting that the of-
ficers follow strict hierarchical protocol and go through the coordina-
tor to reach government counterparts. According to interviews, state 
coordinators with a CA background naturally tend to trust and under-
stand better the work of CAD, including the flexibility required for its 
success:    
 
As a civil affairs officer acting as state coordinator, what I’m doing with my CA 
officers, I’m thinking with them - can we look at their [rebels or different tribes] 
grievances? Look at the concerns, positions and interests of these groups and see 
how we can remove the fire from these groups? So for us in this state, what are 
the historical concerns and grievances and how can we incorporate them into 
modern state structure? CA needs the flexibility to look at underlying causes of 
conflict. How can we address underlying concern of political space when we ha-
ven’t addressed the root causes?102 
                                                 
100 Interview with senior CA officer, Juba. 
101 Interview with senior government official, Upper Nile State. 
102 Interview with state coordinator and senior CA. 
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In the opinion of this state coordinator, those state coordinators who 
have not themselves been through CA experiences may feel uncom-
fortable in backing CA decisions. Yet, as the above-quoted coordina-
tor went on to say ‘in my opinion, the final authority rests with civil 
affairs. What kind of advice did you give your state coordinator? And 
even if they don’t take it, at least document it and send it by email.’103 
One clear example of this was given by a national CA officer in East-
ern Equatoria State: 
 
When people are under threat and government isn’t able to protect them, the UN 
has to come in. We took the decision also to evacuate GTZ Madi staff that were 
being targeted. The [UNMISS] state coordinator and deputy governor were both 
against this, but civil affairs took a decision and Juba [CAD HQ] supported us 
we should move those civilians.104 
Strategies 
Within this somewhat restrictive environment, CA officers find strate-
gies to operate and work in the current institutional framework. They 
act backstage and never directly in peace mediation, usually searching 
for appropriate and legitimate institutional and non-institutional local 
actors such as the church that can take the lead in negotiations. They 
often have to make difficult decisions which on the one hand can 
make them unpopular with UN transport or even state coordinators 
who might feel overruled, while on the other hand the ‘bend the rules’ 
in relation to for example, engagement with rebel groups. For exam-
ple, while UN mission policies as formulated in New York and Juba 
might not allow any contact with rebel militia groups, in the field CA 
officers cannot ignore them: 
 
Civil affairs have to coordinate between New York, national and local level. If X 
[CA officer colleague sitting in the room] goes to the field and one of her key in-
terlocutors is a rebel leader, what do you do – you call him a chief. I call it bend-
ing the rules. You can’t ignore these key figures… so officially you may have to 
call him a different name, for the papers…105 
 
These examples are not unique to CA or to UNMISS. In the UN sys-
tem, as in other bureaucracies, the rules and norms guiding peacekeep-
ing are continuously being developed through the influence of practic-
es on the ground – and there is a premium on developing the ability to 
bend the rules so that work can be implemented using common sense.  
   
                                                 
103  Ibid. 
104  Interview with national CA officer, Torit. GTZ is the former acronym for the German 
development cooperation enterprise Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusam-
menarbeit (GIZ).  
105  Interview with senior CA. 
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Recommendations 
 Continuously consider and reflect on questions of the legitimacy of 
local actors 
 Involve the youth concerned, as well as other groups such as elders 
and women, in peace conferences and events, as well throughout 
the entire long-term follow-up process  
 Continue the decentralized mission agenda that empowers local 
CAD teams to operate contextually and flexibly, including devel-
oping policy lines for state coordinators approach to their local 
substantive teams 
 Sensitize UNDSS and other administrative sections such as 
MOVCON to the flexible nature of peacebuilding/CA work. 
6.  Can the UN strengthen local confidence in the central  
authorities? 
 
UNMISS’s most visible contribution to increasing local confidence in 
the government is in its support in travel arrangements and logistics, 
transporting state and national authorities to remote regions of the 
country and making the government visible and present in eyes of its 
citizens. Civil affairs are central for facilitating these arrangements. 
 
Many in UNDP and other international agencies are critical to the ap-
proach usually taken by peacekeeping missions:  
 
There is a tendency for DPKO to simply take over the government job, and end 
up undermining the very government they were meant to be strengthening. My 
conceptual clash with UNMISS’ approach is on how they deal and engage with 
government. Our conceptual clash – we support a government if it is weak, we 
don’t substitute it. PKO is always very tempted to do the job the government is 
meant to do and take over, and by doing so undermines the very government 
they’re trying to strengthen.106   
Contact point and mediation between UN mission and local actors 
Civil affairs often serve as the institutional memory of the mission at 
both local and national levels. Several CA officers mentioned how 
other sections often come to CA, particularly to national professional 
officers, when they needed information or to gain access to govern-
ment officials or others: ‘All other sections are more or less dependent 
on CA. I’m always chosen to accompany the SRSG or people from 
New York. It makes CA an information centre. Security or military 
come often as well.’107 According to interviewees, it is not uncommon 
                                                 
106  Interview with UNDP official, Juba. 
107  Interview with national CA officer.  
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for other substantive sections to approach CAD requesting their sup-
port in linking them up to a particular local authority or segment of 
society. CAD have a long list of contacts, ranging from school teach-
ers and nurses, and customary authorities in isolated payams or bo-
mas, to members of parliament and the state governor, including op-
position members and local civil society groups.    
 
It is not surprising then, that when the government requires UNMISS 
assistance, they approach CAD, who then get in touch with the appro-
priate UN mission structures. As asserted by one senior government 
official in Upper Nile State: ‘They’re like a mediator between the mis-
sion and the government, trying to convince the mission of what we 
need and want.’ In this manner, CAD functions to support the analysis 
of the political and social context in which the mission and its compo-
nents are working.  
 
The research team also heard of several cases where CA officers 
played a critical role in mediating between UNMISS sections, includ-
ing the military and substantive sections, sensitizing them for particu-
lar aspects of the mission mandate or to the socio-political context. 
Below we present two such examples. 
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Protection of civilians in Jonglei State, and awareness-raising 
among military 
One national CA officer told an anecdote that showed the important 
role CA officers can play in translating local realities into the mis-
sions’ actions, in the context of the protection of civilians in the 
Jonglei crisis between the Lou Nuer and the Murle tribes from March 
to May 2009 in Pibor.108   
 
After a Murle village was burnt by the Lou Nuer, the SPLA was de-
ployed to the region, mostly composed of Dinka and Nuer – which 
exacerbated existing tensions. An incident involving an attack on 
some SPLA soldiers aggravated the situation. UNMIS intervened with 
CA deployed alongside UN Police (UNPOL) and the military, and 
was responsible for mediating between the SPLA commander and the 
Pibor county commissioner. The violence escalated and civilians 
started seeking refuge in the UN Temporary Operating Base.  
 
…Our UN military commander said no civilians were allowed in the base. I told him 
– our mission is to protect civilians. He spoke to his commander, who still said 
no. I refused the orders and went and opened the gate. I allowed 120 civilians in 
and when the compound was full I closed the doors and told all others to stay 
around our temporary camp base as we would put lights and would protect them. 
At 8pm, I requested a meeting with all military and UNPOL and read them our 
mission mandate on protection of civilians. I said - now let’s start planning and 
working together. We started doing patrols. We got a high-level government del-
egation from Juba and Bor to resolve the tension. We removed the 12 SPLA sol-
diers involved.109  
 
Although it acted as a deterrent to further violence, UNMIS pulled out 
after only three months, to the great disappointment of the local au-
thorities.110 The CA officer involved conducted an analysis and chro-
nology of the conflict and of earlier failed peace conferences, and ex-
plored responses for peace. No action was taken, however, and the 
issues have continued throughout the years, claiming thousands of 
lives in the state.  
 
                                                 
108  For a detailed account of this conflict see International Crisis Group, 2009. Jonglei’s 
Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan, Africa Report Nº 154 – 23 De-
cember 2009. The account described above is based on the version given by a CA of-
ficer.  
109 Interview with national CA officer, Juba. 
110 See ICG, 2009, pp. 5–7 in particular. 
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Fact-finding mission in Eastern Equatoria State, coordination and 
advocating a contextual understanding  
Civil affairs officers regularly go on fact-finding missions to high-
tension areas to monitor and collect information. While CAD often 
initiates and leads these missions, at times they are organized by other 
sections such as the human rights section, military observers or others, 
and civil affairs are invited to join. These visits can prove very chal-
lenging in terms of coordination, as exemplified in the case of a joint 
fact-finding mission to one of the counties in Eastern Equatoria State 
in October 2012.      
 
      There is a problem of coordination. I as CA had a clear plan why I wanted to go 
there, to understand what happened. But the military has its own rules. I thought 
we should deploy in X where one person had been killed, but the bridge on the 
way there was broken. I suggested the other APC [armoured personnel carrier] 
could go through there anyway and the other vehicles would go on. But the mili-
tary commander said no. UNDSS and UNPOL agreed with me… we wasted 12 
hours! Very bad CIMIC [civil-military cooperation]… I prefer when we as civi-
lians do our work alone, with no military, only UNDSS.  
 
It can also be challenging to work with human rights officers and mili-
tary observers who have different working approaches and ways of 
asking questions. For example, human rights officers might be inter-
ested in highlighting human rights abuses even though such issues 
might still be too sensitive to take up, and that could lead to further 
tensions. Questions can also be posed in very direct ways that may 
offend people. One of our CA interlocutors mentioned. ‘… the human 
rights officer was making people very nervous. I had to calm down the 
situation.’          
 
We heard of many episodes where CA officers had to deal with the 
situation after the ‘wrong’ questions were asked. They were also re-
ferred as the most visible element of the UN mission in the eyes of 
local institutional and non-institutional stakeholders. 
Information gathering and sharing 
Most national and international interlocutors referred to CAD’s excel-
lent information-gathering skills, but some expressed reservations in 
relation to the degree to which information was shared. There were 
many appeals from both international and government partners for 
greater information sharing. According to one CA officer, during the 
elections and referendum a very good information-sharing system was 
in place. However, a human rights report with very strong language 
got leaked, and that led UN headquarters in New York to tighten the 
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sharing of information. As a senior CA officer argued, ‘[e]veryone 
agrees it should be shared but we have to figure out the modality’.111      
  
Recommendations 
 Allocate all state coordinator positions to individuals with a CA 
background: persons with background from the country or at least 
the region, as well as experience in conflict management, analysis 
and local peacebuilding  
 Promote greater information-sharing of CAD conflict analysis and 
reports within and beyond the UN mission, including to govern-
ment and UNDP, while acknowledging that some information may 
be too politically sensitive to share with the government 
 
 
 
                                                 
111  Interview with senior CA officer, Juba.  
Conclusions  
In South Sudan, civil affairs (CA) is present in all field locations. 
However, in the set-up envisaged by the Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary-General, CA responsibility will focus on their core tasks 
of conflict mitigation and political space, whereas Reintegration, Re-
construction and Peacebuilding (RRP) officers are to be responsible 
for coordinating and enabling the County Support Bases (CSBs).  
 
Civil affairs officers act as ‘space-makers’. As argued by one national 
CA officer, ‘we [civil affairs] don’t have direct funding, but we have 
the information on needs, which we refer to other agencies.’112 The 
CSBs are still in the conceptualization phase, and it is important that 
the mission side of the UN in general and CA in particular should be 
closely involved in this process. Co-location of CA, RRP officers, lo-
cal officials and staff from other UN agencies must be seen as a min-
imum requirement if the CSBs are not to become yet another duplica-
tive and divisive element of UNMISS peacebuilding strategy. All 
peacebuilding and development activities have a political component 
which, if ignored, may have unintended and negative consequences. 
 
The Civil Affairs Division is playing an important role in facilitating 
reconciliation and dialogue in South Sudan. CA officers often remark 
on how they act as ‘travel agents’ facilitating travel for government 
officials at the local, state and national level. In fact, their role should 
not be underestimated, as it enables officials to attend peace confer-
ences and engage with local populations to hear their complaints and 
concerns. This is the first step towards building a social contract be-
tween the government and its people, and a participatory system of 
governance where the periphery can be better linked up with the cen-
tre – in a state where this has only been sheer utopia.  
 
While it is essential for all international actors to work side by side 
with government, it is critical that CA officers, and all other interna-
tional actors operating at the local level, also engage with customary 
authorities. Here one must acknowledge an important difference: be-
tween those appointed by the government on the one hand, and others 
who often remain the most legitimate authority structure in rural areas, 
as well as emerging community-based organizations (CBOs), the local 
churches, youth, women and the local civil society. In many instances, 
the influence of elders and traditional authorities has been weakened 
                                                 
112  Interview with national CA officer, Torit. 
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by the civil war. Moreover, government-appointed chiefs may not 
necessarily be representative of their communities. Thus, all UN offi-
cials and other partners must be able to understand the complex politi-
cal economy and dynamics on state and local levels, in order to do 
more good than harm.     
 
The CSBs are part of a very ambitious plan for further strengthening 
the presence of national authorities on the local level. Based on the 
principle of equality between international peacekeepers and national 
authorities, each of the CSBs will co-locate local authorities with the 
UN, sharing the same standards of buildings, internet access and facil-
ities. They will also facilitate access for other partners within and out-
side the UN system, including CSOs.  
 
As such, the CSBs carry a great promise to the local population, and 
the UN mission will be wise to heed this. However, unless this pres-
ence can be accompanied by service delivery and real peace dividends 
for local populations, the result is likely to be anger and loss of confi-
dence in peacekeepers and local authorities alike. The CSBs will thus 
be a prism through which one can follow and measure to which degree 
the international community and the government in Juba are able to 
instil the trust and confidence needed to achieve ‘real’ peacebuilding 
from the ground up in South Sudan. While all actors should have a 
sober vision about what the UN can realistically be expected to 
achieve with a few CSBs in a country the size of France, there can be 
no doubt that the CSBs will be a noteworthy initiative deserving con-
tinued and careful scrutiny by the international and research commu-
nity alike. 
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